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INDIAN LAND-USE ZONING JURISDICTION: AN ARGUMENT IN
FAVOR OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBER FEE
LANDS WITHIN RESERVATION BOUNDARIES
CARL

I.

G.

HAKANSSON*

INTRODUCTION

At the center of a large portion of the body of jurisprudence
commonly referred to as Indian Law lies a question of jurisdiction.' Few
of these issues have been clearly resolved by the courts, leaving uncertainty in many instances regarding the jurisdictional boundaries of
Indian tribes. 2 The issue of Indian tribal land-use zoning jurisdiction is
no exception.
It has been the pattern of the United States Supreme Court to
interpret tribal land-use zoning jurisdictional cases in the same manner
as other regulatory jurisdictional cases, using Montana v. United States3
as its bellwether decision. 4 This has proven to be problematic, especially
since the Court rarely agrees on their interpretation and application of
Montana.5
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that although the application of portions of the Montana decision are relevant in interpreting tribal jurisdictional boundaries regarding land-use zoning, strict adherence
to both the fact pattern of Montana and the methodology of the
Montana Court's analysis can lead to further complicating an already
ambiguous issue. Part I of this paper will review Montana v. United
States,6 its fact pattern and the Court's analysis. A brief summation of
subsequent Indian regulatory cases will follow. Part II will critically analyze Montana and the subsequent regulatory cases and examine why
* Carl Hakansson has a private law practice where he concentrates on Environmental Law,
Land Use Law, and Indian Law. He started a non-profit organization called the Indian Land
Consolidation and Preservation Fund to work on the issue of Indian land fractionation. He is a
graduate of New England School of Law and is an adjunct professor at Framingham State College in
Framingham, Massachusetts, where he teaches Environmental Law, Land Use Law, and Indian Law.
He would like to thank Jeanne Travers.
1. See generally Thomas. W. Clayton, Brendale v. Yakima Nation: A Divided Supreme Court
Cannot Agree Over Who May Zone Non-Member Fee Lands Within the Reservation, 36 S.D. L. REV.
329 (1991); Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction,
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1989).
2. Clayton, supra note I, at 329, 340-49.
3. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
4. Clayton, supra note 1,at 340-49. See also Veronica L. Bowen, The Extent of Indian Regulatory
Authority Over Non-Indians: South Dakota v. Bourland, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 605 (1994).
5. Clayton, supra note 1, at 340-49.
6. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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literal applications of these cases to a purely land-use zoning issue do
little to clearly define zoning jurisdiction. Part III will delineate B rendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,7 a
1989 tribal zoning case, and compare it to Montana and the other regulatory jurisdictional cases. Part IV will critically analyze the Supreme
Court's decision in Brendale. The discussion of the Court's two plurality opinions, as well as the dissenting opinion, will provide the basis for an
argument in favor of a novel approach to this dilemma. Part V will initiate with the author's alternative proposal in determining a coherent policy regarding tribal land-use zoning, and will follow with a discussion of
several lower court decisions that support a clearer vision and a unified
policy regarding tribal zoning jurisdiction. The paper will conclude with
a summary of alternatives that are available to Indian tribes in effectively
adopting zoning policies that will survive a court challenge.
II.

MONTANA V. UNITED STATES AND OTHER REGULATORY
CASES
A.

MONTANA V. UNITED STATES

1. Facts
In Montana v. United States,8 the issue before the Court was
whether the Crow Tribe could regulate or prohibit hunting and fishing
by non-tribal members on land that was owned in fee simple by
non-Indians but was located within the exterior boundaries of the Crow
reservation. 9 Relying on treaties with the federal government, their
presumptive ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River, and the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe to govern its own, the Crow Tribal Council
adopted several resolutions prohibiting hunting and fishing within the
reservation by anyone who was not a member of the tribe.' 0
The State of Montana asserted that it had authority to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians within the reservation, arguing inter
alia that the state owned the bed of the Big Horn River and that the state
stocked these waters with fish.II The United States, in its role as trustee
of tribal lands, brought suit on behalf of the Tribe.12
7. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
8. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
9. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 544-50 (1981).
10. Id. at 544-49.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 549.
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The federal district court denied relief to the Tribe. 13 The case was
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who reversed the
lower court's decision and further held that the bed of the Big Horn
River was held in trust by the United States for the Tribe. 1 4 The United
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to review that decision.15
2.

The United States Supreme Court's Analysis of Montana v.
United States
a. Treaty Rights

The Crow Tribe argued that two previous treaties with the federal
government had granted the Tribe the power to exclude unwanted
trespassers from reservation lands.1 6 In 1851, the First Treaty of Fort
Laramie1 7 declared that in signing the treaty the Tribe did not "surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing or passing over" any of the lands
subject to dispute between various tribes. 18 The Second Treaty of Fort
Laramie in 186819 further provided the Crow Tribe the exclusive right to
use and occupy the reservation and forbid non-Indians from passing
over, settling upon, or residing in the reservation. 20 This land was to be
held in trust for the Tribe by the federal government. 2 1
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) 2 2
and in 1920 the Crow Allotment Act. 23 These two statutes authorized
"the issuance of patents in fee to individual Indian allottees within the
reservation." 2 4 After a twenty-five year period where the land remained
in trust to the federal government, the Indian was allowed to dispose of
the land in whatever manner he or she chose. 2 5 This policy resulted in
large portions of Indian land being acquired by non-Indians, including
approximately thirty percent of the Crow reservation. 26 This non-Indian
land, though within the reservation boundaries, was now subject to state
13. Id.
14. Id. at 550.
15. Id. at 544.
16. Id. at 548-49.
17. Treaty of Fort Laramie, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749.
18. Montana,450 U.S. at 548.
19. Treaty of Fort Laramie, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
20. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548.
21. Id.; see also Bowen, supra note 4, at 617.
22. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
23. Crow Allotment Act of 1920, ch. 224,41 Stat. 751.
24. The General Allotment Act was amended by the Burke Act in May of 1906 to allow for the
issuance of fee patents. 34 Stat. 182-83.
25. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548.
26. Bowen, supra note 4, at 617 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 548).
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taxation making this land similarly situated to other non-Indian land
located outside reservation boundaries.
In its analysis of this issue, the Court held that the Second Treaty of
Fort Laramie vested in the Crow Tribe the authority to prohibit and
regulate hunting and fishing by non-tribal members but only on such
lands as the Tribe retained the right of "absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation." 2 7 Originally the Tribe retained this right over the
entire reservation. 2 8 The Court, however, held that these rights were
subject to later acts of Congress concerning such lands. 2 9 The Court
further held that the Allotment Acts had significantly reduced the
quantity of land within the exterior boundaries on which the Tribe
enjoyed exclusive occupation. 30 After examining the legislative history
of these Acts, the Court determined that the purpose of this legislation
was the assimilation of the tribes into the non-Indian culture and the
dissolution of the tribes as sovereign entities. 3 1 Accordingly, the notion
of the preservation of tribal authority of hunting and fishing over
non-tribal members on fee lands was inconsistent with the purpose of
these congressional acts. 32
In conclusion, the Court determined that the Allotment Acts abrogated earlier treaty rights which afforded the Tribe the right to prohibit
hunting and fishing by non-tribal members on the reservation. 3 3 In
passing, the Court acknowledged that the Allotment Acts had been
disavowed by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA);34 however
the Court found this to be irrelevant and chose to focus on the affects
that the Allotment Acts had on previous treaties while leaving the
purpose of subsequent acts of Congress unexplored. 35
b. Inherent Sovereignty
In its analysis of the Tribe's inherent authority as a sovereign nation
to prohibit and regulate hunting and fishing, the Court in Montana
looked to United States v. Wheeler, 36 in which the Court delineates the
transformation of Indian tribes from sovereign political entitles to
27. Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59 (quoting the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, art. 1I, 15 Stat. 650).
28. Bowen, supra note 4, at 617.
29. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559-61.
30. Id. at 560-63 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977)).
31. Id. at 559-60.
32. Id. at 561.
33. Id. at 560.
34. Id. at 559 n.9; see also Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 461 (1983)).
35. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9.
36. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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domestic entitles dependent within the territorial jurisdiction of the
federal government. 37 This evolution has resulted in tribes retaining
some characteristics of sovereignty while forfeiting others. 38
The Court interpreted the Tribe's inherent sovereignty as being limited to those powers essential to the operation of tribal government and
to order internal tribal relations. 39 The Court further held that authority
for the Tribe to elicit jurisdiction beyond those boundaries could only
be accorded by an act of Congress. 4 0 Lastly, citing to two criminal jurisdiction cases, the Court determined that a tribe's inherent sovereignty
does not usually encompass "activities of non-members of the tribe." 4 1
c. The Montana Exceptions
The Court further confounded the issue of tribal jurisdiction by
offering two exceptions (the Montana exceptions) to the analysis. 4 2 The
first exception held that Indian tribes did retain authority to tax, license,
or otherwise regulate "non-members who enter [into] consensual
relations with the tribe or its members through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements." 4 3 The second exception
provided that an Indian tribe "may" assert civil jurisdiction over "the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 44
The fact that the first exception was not applicable to the fact
pattern of the case, combined with the failure of the Court to find the
requisite nexus between hunting and fishing regulations and the parameters offered in the second exception, resulted in both Montana
exceptions being denied. 45 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Tribe
had no inherent sovereign authority to regulate hunting and fishing of
non-members on fee lands within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation. 4 6
37. Bowen, supra note 4, at 618.
38. Id.
39. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 565 (discussing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978)).
42. Id. at 565-66.
43. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
152-54 (1980); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904);
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 980 (8th Cir. 1905)).
44. Id. at 566 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 383, 389 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-29 (1906);
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 566-67.
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NON-ZONING REGULATORY CASES SUBSEQUENT TO MONTANA V.

UNITED STATES

In the sixteen years since Montana, the United States Supreme
Court has had occasion to review several cases concerning tribal
regulation of non-member Indians and non-Indians, but few of these
have been purely land-use zoning in nature.
1. Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe4 7 involved non-tribal members
who entered into a lease with the Jicarilla Apache Tribe to develop petroleum resources on tribally owned land.4 8 Subsequent to the execution of
the lease, the Tribe adopted a severance tax on oil and gas extracted
from tribally owned lands. 49 The lessees sought a permanent injunction
in federal district court to invalidate this tax as it applied to them. 50
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax against the lessees
stating that the Tribe retained inherent sovereign authority to tax
non-members while implying that this tax could also extend to all lands
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. 5 1
2.

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe

One year after Merrion, the Court ruled on a case with a fact pattern
somewhat similar to that of Montana. In New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 5 2 the Court was asked to rule on the validity of state
hunting and fishing regulations that were being enforced against
non-tribal members on reservation land. 5 3
The Court denied that the rule of Montana was applicable in this
instance stating that Montana involved fee simple land held by nonmembers of the tribe, while the land in Mescalero Apache was tribally
owned or land held in trust for the tribe by the federal government. 5 4
The Court held that: "State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation
of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 135 (1982).
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137, 152.
462 U.S. 324 (1983).
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983).
Id. at 330-31.
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interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." 5 5
3.

United States v. Dion

In 1986, the Court was asked to rule on a case concerning a conflict
between tribal hunting rights established by treaty and subsequent
federal laws enacted for the preservation of wildlife.56 In United States
v. Dion,57 the defendant, a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was
tried and convicted for shooting four bald eagles and one golden eagle
on the Yankton Sioux Reservation. 58 These acts were determined to be
in violation of the Federal Endangered Species Act 59 and the Bald Eagle
60
Protection Act (Eagle Protection Act).
On appeal, Dion argued that treaty rights granted to the Yankton
Sioux Tribe by the federal government provided that the Tribe would
have exclusive hunting rights on reservation lands, therefore nullifying
the application of the Endangered Species Act and the Eagle Protection
Act against tribal members. 6 1 The Government argued that these treaty
rights had been abrogated by a subsequent act of Congress. 62
The Court explained that for a subsequent act of Congress to abrogate treaty rights, the intent of Congress should be "clear and plain" but
need not necessarily be express. 63 Thus an act could be found to abrogate treaty rights by implication if by examining the legislative history.
the face of the document, or the surrounding circumstances it became
clear that Congress intended to limit treaty rights. 64 The Court further
held that: "What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and
Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty." 6 5
In its examination of the Eagle Protection Act, the Court cited to the
exception allowing for tribes to take eagles under a permit granted by
the Secretary of the Interior to the tribe "for the religious purposes of
Indian tribes." 66 Noting that this conflict with treaty rights had been
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 334.
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id. (citing the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 884 (as amended 16 U.S.C. § 668dd)).
Id. (citing the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 54 Stat. 250 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668 - 668d)).
Id. at 735-37.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
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intended by Congress, the Court determined that it was the implied intent
of Congress to abrogate previous treaty rights, and thus denied Dion's
7
defense. 6
4.

South Dakota v. Bourland

In 1993, the Court decided still another case involving the jurisdictional limits of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing on land
located within the original reservation boundaries. 6 8 The facts of South
Dakota v. Bourland69 are as follows. The federal government negotiated
with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe for the purchase of reservation
land with the purpose of building the Oahe Dam and Reservoir. 70 This
parcel contained 104,420 acres owned or held in trust for the Tribe and
18,000 acres of privately owned fee lands. 7 1 A portion of this land was
eventually submerged beneath the waters of the reservoir and the
remaining land abutted the reservoir. 72
In accordance with the Cheyenne River Act of 1954,73 tribal members retained certain rights in this "taken" land; among those being the
right to hunt and fish on these lands including the lands previously held
in fee by non-Indians. 7 4 The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe subsequently
enforced their hunting and fishing laws on this land against tribal members and non-tribal members alike. 75 The State of South Dakota concurrently enforced its hunting and fishing regulations on this portion of
land, as well as other fee lands within the reservation, against non-tribal
members only. 76
Unlike previous years when the Tribe and the State were able to
negotiate an agreement regarding hunting and fishing regulations, in
1988 no agreement was realized and the Tribe proclaimed that state deer
hunting licenses would not be recognized by the Tribe and that those
who hunted on any reservation land without a tribal license would be
prosecuted criminally by the Tribe.77 The State then sought relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota seeking
injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment concerning three issues:
67. Id. at 740, 743-45.
68. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 681-82 (1993).
69. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
70. Id. at 683-84.
71. Id.
72. South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 1991).
73. 68 Stat. 1191.
74. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 988.
75. South Dakota v. Ducheneaux, No. 88-3049, slip op. at 4 (D.S.D. Aug. 21, 1990) (citing the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984).
76. id. at 4.
77. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 988.
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(1) whether the Tribe had authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians who hunted and fished on the reservation; (2) whether the
Tribe had the authority to exclude non-Indians from public lands within
the reservation; and (3) whether the reservation boundaries had been
diminished when the federal government gained possession of the
78
land.
The district court, citing to the tenet of Montana, rejected the
Tribe's argument as to its ability to regulate hunting and fishing against
non-members on any of the taken land or fee land. 79 On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the appellate court
held that the tribe retained civil jurisdiction over non-members on the
former trust lands that had been taken. 80 The issue of jurisdiction over
8
non-members on the former fee lands was not appealed. 1
After granting certiorari, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court rejected the findings of the Eighth Circuit and embraced the rule
of Montana. The Court held that regardless of the purpose, Congress
had broadly opened up the land to non-Indians, thus dissolving
82
pre-existing tribal rights to regulatory control.
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MONTANA V. UNITED STATES AND
SUBSEQUENT NON-ZONING REGULATORY CASES
This section will address the distinct quandary of jurisdictional
uncertainty remaining in the wake of Montana. Part IV follows with a
critical analysis of Brendale and an accompanying discussion regarding
why a land-use zoning jurisdictional issue, as found in Brendale, should
not necessarily be addressed in terms of the Montana decision.
A.

THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF MONTANA V. UNITED STATES

There are certain issues in the Court's landmark decision of Montana v. United States that have become the source of much dispute and
debate. 8 3 In its analysis of treaty-based rights available to the tribe, the
Court in Montana was confronted with three major issues: (1) whether
the Tribe had power to exclude; (2) whether the treaty-based right was
central to the tribe's cultural existence; and (3) whether the treaty-based
84
right had been modified or abrogated by a subsequent act of Congress.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Bourland, 949 F.2d at 988; Ducheneaux, slip op. at 1-3.
Ducheneaux, slip op. at 12-21.
Bourland, 949 F.2d at 994.
Id. at 989 n.l.
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 693 (1993).
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556-59 (1981).
Id. at 556-59.
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The Court held that in light of congressional intent in its adoption of the
General Allotment Act, the land had been opened to non-Indian settlement, thus abrogating the earlier Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, reducing the area of exclusion originally granted to the Tribe, and rendering
the right of exclusion no longer central to the Tribe's existence. 85
In its interpretation of these issues, the majority chose to disregard
several well established doctrines in Indian jurisprudence. Since the
early twentieth century it has been the custom of the United States
Supreme Court to interpret treaties that were assumed to be the consequence of unfair bargaining by: (1) resolving ambiguous language in
the treaty in favor of the tribe; (2) interpreting treaties as Indians would
have when they entered into them; and (3) construing treaties liberally in
favor of Indians. 86 Perhaps the Court could claim that the aforementioned treaties and subsequent statutes were unambiguous and clear on
their face. However, a strong argument could be made that by the time
Montana appeared before this Court, it was accepted that few tribes
would have voluntarily entered into treaties that would have the
consequences of reducing their land base and their inherent sovereignty
with little in return unless there was uncertainty as to the text of the
document.
Another suspect issue in Montana is the Court's reliance on the
legislative intent of the General Allotment Act of 1887,87 while failing to
consider the same rationale with regard to the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 (IRA).88 The adoption of the IRA refuted the purpose of the
Allotment Act, yet instead of relying on the legislative intent of the IRA,
the Court chose to adopt the position that the IRA had not reinstated the
right to exclude. 8 9 This opinion is in direct opposition to what has been
federal government policy since the early 1970s, the support of tribal
self-determination. 90
In its analysis as to whether the Tribe retained its power to zone as a
segment of its inherent sovereignty, the Court looked to United States v.
Wheeler, a case involving a question of criminal jurisdiction. 9 1 The
85. Id.at 556-63.
86. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth-How Long a Time is That?," 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 601, 617 (1975); see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973);
United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 654, 577
(1908).
87. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559-63.
88. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
89. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559-60 n.9.
90. President's Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970).
91. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-66 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23, 326
(1978)).
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Court cited to Wheeler in holding that the Tribe's inherent sovereignty is
limited to those powers necessary to defend tribal self-government and
to order internal tribal relations. 9 2 The Court further held that the
exercise of tribal authority beyond what is necessary for self-government
and ordering internal affairs can only emanate from an explicit act of
3
Congress. 9
The position that the majority took in Montana may in fact be
applicable to criminal cases, 94 but regulatory enforcement is more often
pursued through civil litigation than criminal litigation.9 5 It is well established that tribes retain much broader jurisdiction over civil matters than
criminal matters on reservation land. 9 6 In conclusion, the Court also
found the two exceptions to be inapplicable to the Montana fact
pattern.97

B.

SUBSEQUENT NON-ZONING REGULATORY CASES

In Merrion, the Court upheld the severance tax adopted by the
Tribe. 9 8 The Court held that the validity of the tax was supported by the
fact that taxation of non-members on tribal land was retained as a source
of its inherent sovereignty. 9 9 The Court in Merrion did not cite to
Montana in its opinion. 100 In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
the Court delineated the rule applied in Montana from its own findings
by stating that Montana concerned fee lands and Mescalero Apache
concerned tribal lands, therefore nullifying a strict adherence to
Montana.lOl
In United States v. Dion, the Court applied the subsequent abrogation theory used in Montana.10 2 The Court was able to substitute the
Eagle Protection Act for the General Allotment Act used in Montana.10 3
What differentiates Dion from Montana regarding the abrogation theory
92. Id. at 564.
93. Id. at 564-65.
94. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
95. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) ("Although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject to
substantial federal limitation, their civil jurisdiction is not similarly restricted")); see also F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 253-54 (1982) ("The development of principles governing civil
jurisdiction in Indian country has been markedly different from the development of rules dealing with
criminal jurisdiction").
96. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14-5; National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S.
845, 854-55 (1985).
97. Montana,450 U.S. at 566-67.
98. Men-ion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1982).
99. Id.
100. Bowen, supra note 4, at 621.
101. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983).
102. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743 (1986).
103. Id. at 738-46.
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however, is that there was no further act of Congress subsequent to the
04
Eagle Protection Act as there had been with the IRA in Montana.l
Therefore the Court did not have to consider the relevance of a
subsequent act.
In South Dakota v. Bourland, the Court once again rendered a strict
application of Montana in enforcing the subsequent abrogation of treaty
theory.lO5 The Court then magnified the scope of that theory to include
not only the Allotment Act, but any land transfer that was the result of a
06
congressional act.1
It is the opinion of some that the Bourland Court's embrace of
Montana and its application to the Bourland fact pattern will settle the
uncertainty regarding regulatory authority between Indian tribes and
non-Indians. 107 That may be true with regard to hunting and fishing
regulations; however Part IV of this paper will suggest that not only is
that theory highly suspect with regard to land-use zoning jurisdictional
issues, but that the application of much of the Montana case to current
land-use zoning issues is irrelevant and misleading.
IV. BRENDALE V. CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS OF THE
YAKIMA INDIAN NATION
All the aforementioned cases in Part I share the distinction of being
regulatory in nature. The cases subsequent to Montana were all analyzed using Montana as a precedent. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima NationlO8 is treated separately owing to the fact
that Brendale is a purely land-use zoning case. The analysis in Part IV
will suggest that purely land-use zoning issues should be scrutinized
distinctly and separately from other regulatory cases.
A. FACTS
The Yakima Indian Reservation was created by treaty with the
United States Government in 1855.109 As a consequence of the General
Allotment Act of 1887, approximately twenty percent of the land within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation was claimed in fee by nonIndians."1 0 The reservation was subsequently divided informally into an
"open area," where eighty percent of the population and fifty percent
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
951,952.
110.

Id.
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687-94 (1993).
Id. at 691-93.
See Bowen, supra note 4, at 658-59.
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
Treaty Between the United States and the Yakima Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat.
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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of the land were non-Indian, and a "closed area," which is inhabited
exclusively by Indians who own ninety percent of the land. II
In 1970, the Yakima Nation adopted its first zoning ordinance
which was applicable to all lands within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation.'12 Yakima County established its own comprehensive
zoning ordinance in 1972.113 This ordinance was applicable to all land
114
within Yakima County except for Indian land held in trust.
In April 1983, Brendale, a part-Indian non-tribal member, filed an
application to the Yakima County Planning Board to subdivide a twenty
acre plot in the "closed area" into ten two-acre sights.'15 During the
public comment period, the Yakima Nation responded that the County
was without jurisdiction to zone the Brendale property. 116 The County
Board of Commissioners held that the County did in fact have
jurisdiction. 117
Yakima Nation filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory
judgment as to their exclusive jurisdiction to zone this property and
sought injunctive relief to enjoin any land-use activity in violation of
their zoning ordinance. 118 The district court held in favor of the Tribe
regarding its claim of jurisdiction to zone the Brendale property."1 9 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
20
the Tribe's authority to zone the Brendale property.1
In September of 1983, shortly after the Brendale application, Wilkinson, a non-Indian, applied to the County to subdivide his three acres in
the "open area" of the reservation into twenty lots of varying size. 121
Again the Yakima Nation protested this proposal claiming tribal jurisdiction to zone Wilkinson's land and once again the County Board of
Commissioners reasoned that they in fact had jurisdiction and approved
Wilkinson's proposal.' 22
The Yakima Nation again filed suit in district court praying for the
same injunctive and declaratory relief as with the Brendale parcel. 123
Ill. Id. at 436-37.
112. Id. at 414.
ll3. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 417-18.
116. Id.
1l7. Id.
118. Id. at 419-20 (citing Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wa. 1985)
(Whiteside I) (also referred to as the Brendale case)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 419-23.
121. Id. at 418-21.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Yakima Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Wa. 1985) (Whiteside 11)
(also referred to as the Wilkinson case)).
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However, unlike the Brendale parcel, the district court held that the
Wilkinson parcel was subject to County zoning authority. 124 On appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Court reversed the
ruling of the district court and remanded the case. 125 The Appeals Court
found the Yakima Nation to have presumptive authority to zone all lands
within the borders of the reservation, unless there was a significant
County interest in regulating the parcels that outweighed the Tribe's
interest in administering long term land-use laws. 126 These cases, consolidated by the Court of Appeals, were then granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. 127
B.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

Once again the Court looked at Montana for guidance in its approach to the Brendale issue. 128 The Court in Brendale, as it had in
Montana, looked for both treaty-based and sovereign-based authority in
its determination of tribal jurisdictional rights.1 29
After analyzing the Treaty of 1855, which had created the Yakima
Reservation, the Court was unable to determine whether the Tribe had
been granted land-use zoning jurisdiction over non-member fee
lands. 130 The Court then applied the more subjective test of whether the
Tribe's power to zone arose from its inherent sovereignty, and if so,
whether Congress had within its plenary power over the tribes divested
them of that power either through treaty, statute, or implication. 13 1
Underscoring the express purpose of this paper, the Brendale Court
fractionated into three distinct groups, making an already ambiguous
issue less coherent.13 2 One plurality opinion gave Yakima County jurisdiction over a parcel in the "open area" of the reservation, identified by
a primarily non-tribal population with significant non-Indian fee
ownership and prevailing county services. 133 The other plurality gave
124. Id. at 420-23.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. The consolidated case at the appeals level was known as Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987). Yakima County did not appeal the
decision of Whiteside I (the Brendale case). Id. at 420-23. Before the district court could re-hear the
Wilkinson case; Brendale, Wilkinson, and Yakima County petitioned to the United States Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari, which was granted. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
128. See Clayton, supra note 1, at 334.
129. Clayton, supra note 1, at 344.
130. Clayton, supra note 1, at 336.
131. Clayton, supranote 1, at 337 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978); National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S.
845, 851 (1985)).
132. Clayton, supra note 1, at 329.
133. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 414-33
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the Yakima Nation jurisdiction over a parcel in the "closed area" where
no significant non-tribal cultural and religious interests were paramount. 134 Justice Blackmun wrote a strong dissenting opinion rejecting
35
the result of the first plurality and the methodology of the second.1
V.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BRENDALE

The Court's disjointed opinion in Brendale exemplifies not only
how a strict application of Montana, both factually and procedurally, to
a land-use zoning jurisdiction issue is inadequate, but also how such an
application is totally beyond the realm of effecting a workable solution.
The Court initially looked to treaty-based authority in allowing tribes to
enforce land-use zoning ordinances against non-Indian fee land
owners. 136 Considering the fact that comprehensive land-use ordinances
of any kind were not adopted in the United States until well after the
treaty period 137 it is not difficult to understand why the Court was unable
38
to find such a reference in the treaties.1
Secondly, the Court looked to the issue of tribal authority to enforce zoning via its inherent sovereignty. 139 It has been broadly stated
that Congress, in its plenary power over the tribes, has the power to divest
the tribes of their sovereignty as it sees fit. 140 However it is also widely
accepted that until Congress acts, "Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty, statute, or by implication
14 1
as a necessary result of their dependent status."
(1989).
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 433-48.
Id. at 448-68.
Clayton, supra note 1, at 334-35.
The seventeenth century land-use regulations were based on nuisance concepts. A.

RAm-

KOPT,THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.01 (4th ed. 1983). These common law principles were

applied during this time on a case-by-case basis to enjoin unreasonable uses of land. R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.04 (2d ed. 1976). Further regulation was eventually accomplished via
restrictive covenants prohibiting specific land uses. Id.
By the early twentieth century comprehensive land-use systems were beginning to appear. A.
RATHKOPT, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.01[2] (4th ed. 1983). In 1916, the Board of Estimate

and Apportionment of the City of New York promulgated what is considered the first comprehensive
zoning regulation. The purpose of this resolution was to protect central Manhattan from further
overcrowding due to anticipated improvements in transportation facilities. The resolution was upheld
as a valid exercise of the police power by the New York Court of Appeals in 1920. Lincoln Trust Co.
v. Williams Building Corp., 128 N.E. 209, 211 (N.Y. 1920).
138. The constitutionality of a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance was not established
until 1926. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365, 379-97 (1926). Euclid was
followed by a number of cases that established the validity of zoning plans which divided
municipalities into districts, each of which limited land usage. N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING
LAW-LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER §§ 5.03-5.04 (1974). A detailed history of the early zoning
decisions can be found in treatises. See, e.g., E. BASSETr, ZONING-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS (1936);
E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1-I to 3-27 (4th ed. 1978).

139. Clayton, supra note 1, at 336-37.
140. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also National Farmers Union Ins.
Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
141. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324.
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Regardless of this precedent, Justice White, writing for one plurality
in Brendale held inter alia that the power to zone did not flow from the
power to govern itself or from the power to control internal affairs. 142
He further stated that there had been no specific grant of zoning authority from Congress, therefore it did not exist. 14 3 Justice Stevens, writing
for the other plurality, ruled inter alia that the "change of neighborhood" rule of equitable servitudes denied the tribe the ability to enforce
zoning laws against non-Indians on areas of the reservation that were
predominantly occupied by non-Indians because it did not further the
14 4
tribe's interests.

The disparity in the Court's various opinions reflects a basic misunderstanding of the issue at hand. To adjudge a solution for this
relatively new phenomenon of comprehensive zoning using a criteria
originally adopted to address hunting and fishing issues is fruitless.14 5
Instead of delving through the past in search of treaty references to
modern concepts and pursuing an inference from Congress in an area in
which Congress has yet to effectively speak, the Court may have been
wise to consider Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Brendale
which espouses a review of current federal government policy.14 6

Justice Blackmun based his dissenting opinion on tribal sovereignty
and on the federal government's policy of self-determination. 147 Blackmun proposed that tribes retain exclusive zoning jurisdiction where the
tribe had enacted a comprehensive zoning code.14 8 He further stated
that the County should have jurisdiction to zone Indian country only
where the tribe had not exercised its authority.1 49 Blackmun further
attacked the plurality opinions by stating that they enhanced the state of
"checkerboard" jurisdiction, which under the rule of Montana and
supported in part by the plurality opinions in Brendale, allowed for land
to be jurisdictionally fractionated, rendering any comprehensive zoning
code ineffective and unenforceable.15 0
142. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 412-32
(1989).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 441-44. "Under the 'change of neighborhood' doctrine, an equitable servitude lapses
when the restriction, as applied to 'the general vicinity and not merely a few parcels,' has 'become
outmoded,' has 'lost its usefulness,' or has become 'inequitable' to enforce." Id. at 447 (quoting R.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.20 (1984)).
145. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
146. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 447-67.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 467-68.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 3025-26.
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VI. AUTHOR'S PROPOSAL AND LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Of the myriad of problems that currently plague Indian Country,
land fractionation and the lack of effective land-use policies are among
the most influential.15 1 Jurisdictional uncertainty prohibits many tribes
from effectively enforcing environmental codes thereby leaving tribal
natural resources at risk.152 This is also detrimental to the design of a
tribal economic development plan that could enhance the tribes self-sufficiency and alleviate tribal dependency on the federal government. 153
The United States Supreme Court's strict application of Montana to
the Brendale case only enhanced the premise that a novel approach is
necessary in addressing tribal land-use zoning issues. A new approach
needs to address the issues specific to comprehensive zoning and apart
from other regulatory jurisdictional problems.
One criteria that has evolved in a series of lower court decisions
embraces the second Montana exception which allows for tribes to assert
civil jurisdiction over "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe." 154 This exception is harmonious with the express purpose of
comprehensive zoning and is consistent with the federal government's
policy of promoting tribal self-determination. This tenet is also consistent with the numerous Supreme Court cases which have held the original boundaries of Indian reservations to still be intact in spite of the
eventual transfer of some reservation lands to non-Indians. 155
Several lower court decisions have upheld the enforcement of tribal
zoning codes against non-Indians on fee lands. In Knight v. Shoshone
and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 156 the defendants, James and Karen
Knight, were non-Indian owners of fee lands on the Wind River Indian
151. Id.; see also Carl G. Hakansson, Allotment at Pine Ridge Reservation: Its Consequences and
Alternative Remedies, 73 N.D. L. REV. 231 (1997).
152. In October of 1996, a zeolite mine was proposed for fee lands located near Manderson on
Pine Ridge Reservation. Although Manderson is located in the center of Pine Ridge Reservation, this
land was technically under state regulatory jurisdiction. Pine Ridge currently has no comprehensive
land-use bylaw and was in pursuit of other legal recourse to enjoin this operation. It was eventually
determined that although a non-Indian owned the surface rights to the land, the mineral rights had
been retained by the previous Indian land owner. Jean Roach, Proposed Zeolite Mine is Undermined,
INDIAN CouNTRy TODAY, Nov. 4-11, 1996, at B2.
153. Clayton, supra note 1,at 349.
154. See Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982); Superior
Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674 (D. Utah 1985); Cardin v. DeLaCruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366 (9th
Cir. 1982) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66).
155. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620, 621 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
156. 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Reservation in Wyoming who were attempting to divide their property to
create a thirty-two lot subdivision.1 57 After this proposal, but before its
submission for approval, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Business Councils
enacted Tribal Ordinance Number 38,158 a tribal zoning code which
applied to:
[A]ll lands within the exterior boundaries of Wind River
Reservation, whether held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of individual Indians, or for the Shoshone and
Arapahoe tribes, or held in fee by Indians or non-Indians.1 59
Subsequently, the Knight's filed their subdivision plan with the
Freemont County Planning Commission and the Tribes brought an
action in federal district court to enjoin the subdivision proposal until it
had been approved by the Tribes.160
The district court upheld the Tribe's claim of jurisdiction over the
lands involved in the proposed subdivision and the defendants appealed
the decision.161 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the lower court's decision ruling that the Tribes retained
jurisdiction to zone the fee lands.1 6 2 In its decision, the Court cited to
the second Montana exception stating:
"Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty power to exercise
some forms of jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands." 16 3 One proper form of
the exercise of that power may be in response to "conduct
[which] threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
4
tribe."1 6
Cardin v. DeLaCruz 165 involved a non-Indian owner of a thirty-two
acre lot of land within the exterior boundaries of the Quinault Indian
Reservation in Washington on which he operated a grocery and general
store.166 The Quinault Tribe requested and obtained an injunction from
the Tribal Court to close the store for violations of tribal building, health,
157.
158.
159.
Tribes).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 901 (1982).
Id.at 901.
Id. (citing Tribal Ordinance No. 38, a tribal zoning code for Arapahoe and Shoshone
Id. at 901-02.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
Id.
671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982).
Cardin v. DeLaCruz, 671 F.2d 363, 364 (9th Cir. 1982).
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and safety codes. 16 7 The store owner then filed an action in federal
district court seeking to enjoin tribal officers from regulating the opera68
tion of his business.'
The district court ruled in favor of the store owner, holding that the
Tribe lacked jurisdiction to enforce its building, health, and safety regulation against him. 169 The district court based its decision largely on the
United States Supreme Court decision of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 170 a criminal case, in holding "that the tribe's power of selfgovernment to regulate the internal and social relations of its members
did not extend to non-Indian plaintiffs."' 7 ' This decision was further
72
appealed by the appellants.1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court's decision stating that Oliphant concerned itself with
tribal criminal jurisdiction and made no mention of civil or regulatory
jurisdiction.17 3 The Court further cited to the second Montana exception in holding that health regulations were a valid purpose for tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land owners, thus upholding
the tribal code against the non-Indian land owner. 174
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit once again ruled on an Indian zoning
case. In Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 175 the
Tribes brought an action against non-Indian owners of fee land fronting
on the south half of Flathead Lake in an attempt to regulate the landowners' riparian rights on the lake. 176 The United States District Court
for Montana ruled that the Tribes had no authority to regulate the
riparian rights of non-Indian landowners. 177 The Ninth Circuit, reversed
the lower court, once again citing to the second Montana exception in
holding that the conduct the Tribe was attempting to regulate had the
potential for significantly affecting the economy, health and welfare of
78
the Tribes. 1

In Superior Oil Company v. United States, 179 the oil companies
brought an action against the United States, the Navajo Tribe, and the
officers of the Tribe, arising from the Tribe's failure to act on the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 365.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Cardin, 671 F.2d at 365.
Id.
Id. at 365-67.
Id. at 366 (citing Montana,450 U.S. at 565-66).
665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 951.
Id. at 964.
605 F. Supp. 674 (D. Utah 1985).

740

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 73:721

companies requests for approval of assignment of oil and gas leases and
seismic testing permits.' 8 0
The United States District Court for Utah dismissed this complaint
holding inter alia that the Court had no authority to order the Tribe to
approve permits because such an order would impose on the Tribe's
sovereignty partially derived from the second Montana exception authorizing the Tribe's regulatory jurisdiction in matter's of tribal economic
security, health, and welfare.1SI
Each of the decisions above provide for a broad recognition of
tribal authority to regulate non-Indian fee land owners through zoning
or other health related codes that are at once in harmony with the basic
premise of a comprehensive land-use plan and the Federal Government's policy of self-determination for Indian tribes. These cases also
reveal a willingness of the lower courts to delineate between purely landuse zoning jurisdiction fact patterns and other forms of regulatory jurisdiction involving non-Indian fee lands within reservation boundaries.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court decision of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation suggests that a strict application
of Montana v. United States to each Indian regulatory jurisdiction
scenario is inadequate.1 8 2 A novel approach that integrates current
federal government policy concerning tribal self-determination with the
modem precepts of comprehensive land-use zoning is essential.
In the absence of a clear congressional directive concerning comprehensive land-use zoning for Indian tribes, the Court should refrain from
embracing the entire rule of Montana and consider the application of
the second Montana exception. The consistent application of this
exception by lower courts has offered an approach which is both
well-defined and uniform.
In consideration of these lower court decisions, as well as the
modern approach to comprehensive land-use zoning, it would serve
tribes well to not only enact a comprehensive land-use zoning policy;
but to insure that the ordinance is explicit in its purpose to protect the
political integrity, economic security, as well as the health and welfare of
the tribe.

180. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674, 677 (D. Utah 1985).
181. Id. at 683-84.
182. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).

